This was received from the author, who remains anonymous. The following note accompanied the text:

Given the current situation in Somalia, this attempt to analyze Ethiopia's views on Somalia may be of some interest to the group - though I apologize for the length. It was apparently felt necessary last time I sent out a piece to add a note to the effect that as I was taking a position similar to that of the Ethiopian government I must therefore be in that government. I should therefore perhaps reiterate that I am not an Ethiopian official. I am a consultant resident in Ethiopia with long experience in Somalia and the Horn
of Africa.

Antony Shaw

12/4/2006

While the UN Security Council continues to consider the options on Somalia - either tightening its currently ineffectual arms embargo on Somalia, or lifting it partially to allow the deployment of a regional peace-support force for Somalia's embattled Transitional Federal Government (TFG), or both - it is perhaps worth looking again at some of the issues involved and try to clear away some of the numerous misconceptions which bedevil consideration of the issues.

There is a very appropriate Somali phrase - "warbaa ugu gaajo xun", worst of all is the hunger for news; but it must be accurate news, not embellished or exaggerated as is most of the alleged information on Somalia, in
Particular the issue of the arms embargo and a peace-support force which has generated a lot of discussion and controversy. Much of it from people who should know better has been specious and misleading. Comments from both sides of the argument have frequently been based on unsound fallacies, often from ignorance, but frequently displaying political malice, deliberately and irresponsibly inaccurate. Indeed, it is hard to disagree with one recent assessment: "It is painful to see that an extremely large number of Somali websites are tabloids of tribal malevolence" www.wardheernews.com . Malevolence, political misinterpretation, ignorance and inaccuracy are not, however, confined toSomali web sites, they have been just as widely available in the media and among political analysis.

Critics argue that the deployment of an African or a regional peace-keeping or peace-support operation in Baidoa would increase the possibility of war. The point is made, quite correctly, that the Council of Somali
Islamic Courts (CSIC) has made a number of threats of all-out war in the Horn of Africa if foreign troops are sent into Somalia. * [1] This warning should certainly be taken seriously as indeed should the latestwarnings by Sheikh Abdirahman Ali Mudey, of the CSIC Information department, that sending foreign troops to Baidoa " could only jeopardize the peace efforts" (2.12.2006); and a few days earlier, by Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed
Siad 'Inde Adde', head of CSIC security, that the courts will call Muslim fighters from around the world to participate in a jihad against any peace-keeping forces.

In fact, of course, as the recent UN Monitoring Report (November 2006) makes clear this has already been done, and hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign fighters (including two or three thousand Eritrean troops) have
already been deployed by the CSIC. The denials by the CSIC and the countries involved are less than convincing; equally unconvincing has been Ethiopia's denial of sending no more than trainers to the TFG.

One of the stranger criticisms of deploying a peace-support force is that it would set off a flood of arms embargo violations. To allow a strictly limited amount of arms with the peace-support units as well as, again
strictly limited and identified, supplies for the TFG's own security forces, can hardly be so described. Equally, with a dozen or so countries pouring arms into Somalia such controlled exemptions can hardly be relevant.
Incidentally, while most commentators have rightly noticed that Ethiopia is taken to task by the report for supplying arms to the TFG, there has been little comment on the accompanying remarks that: "...arms provided to the TFG ...overwhelmingly include the types that are historically typical for the Somali environment...[while] ominously, new and more sophisticated types of weapons are coming into Somalia [for the CSIC] including portable surface-to-air missiles...multiple rocket launchers and second Generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons." (UN Monitoring Report, November 2006 paragraphs 6-8)

Most comment has essentially accepted a CSIC line in confining criticism to the presence of Ethiopian troops even though these forces are there at request of a legitimate Somali government facing the threat of a belligerent CSIC and to train the TFG's own security forces. It appears that for most analysts and commentators, as for the CSIC itself, it is only the foreign troops that support the TFG that are unacceptable.

Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, speaking to the Somali Institute for Peace and Justice recently, has not been alone in suggesting that the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia inflames Somali
Nationalism and increases Somali antagonism towards Ethiopia as well as encourages regional instability. The former may well be true, but the encouragement of regional instability surely comes rather more from Sheikh Aweys' attempted resuscitation of Somali irredentism. A rather similar Somali argument has been that "the active presence of Ethiopia in Somalia has forced (my italics) its bitter rival Eritrea to support the UIC." Forced is hardly the right word. It is clear Eritrea has been only too delighted to add another element to its current campaign for the destabilization of Ethiopia.

In this context, a point that is seldom made is that deployment of a regional, IGAD, or an African force, would automatically allow for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Baidoa. Their presence has clearly been
controversial, and as a result, Ethiopia has accepted that its participation would not be appropriate for such a force. Nor, of course, would they be required if there was an international force present to protect the TFG against attacks by the CSIC. Indeed, it has been obvious for months that this would probably be the quickest way to encourage Ethiopian forces to pull out of Somalia. Equally, in light of CSIC aggression, they might
be unlikely to pull back far across the border.

There are certainly clear possible dangers in launching a peace support operation though it must be questionable whether the overt and obvious threats of terrorist activities should be allowed to set the agenda for the future of Somalia. The apparent suicide car bomb explosion at a police check-point at Baidoa (30.11.2006) underlines the point. The CSIC officially denied responsibility, but one of its commanders confirmed the involvement of the courts. The prime suspects must the jihadist elements in the CSIC, specifically al-Shebaab and its commander, Sheikh Aden Hashi Ayro, who is believed to have a long record of killings in Mogadishu over the last
two or three years; Al-Shebaab was almost certainly responsible for the car bomb attempt to kill President Abdullahi Yusuf in September.

It is worth considering what would happen in the absence of either Ethiopian or other international troops in Baidoa. There can be little doubt that the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in or around Baidoa now, as the CSIC
demand, would lead to an immediate advance by the CSIC. The CSIC's assumption, which may be exaggerated, is that it would easily defeat the forces of the TFG, the core of which is Puntland militia loyal to President Abdullahi Yusuf. The expectation is that he would then attempt to retreat to his previous base in Puntland where the CSIC would immediately follow to try and implement their recently declared intention to take over its
functional and relatively peaceful administration in the name of Islam.

Certainly, the CSIC has made it clear it would not stop at Baidoa. CSIC leaders have insisted on a number of occasions that they intend to take over both Puntland and Somaliland, the only two areas of functional
government in recent years, and then launch attacks on Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia to claim control over all Somali-speaking areas. On November 18, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, head of the CSIC shura, referring to 'Greater Somalia' told AP that: "It is unbelievable that a country population that is like one family to be divided into 10 parts. As Islamic Courts, we will not accept divisions and we will gain back the Somali provinces forcibly annexed to Ethiopia and Kenya....We will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali
brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia.".

This was not, as Shebelle Media Network claimed, the first time he had made such remarks. Shortly after he appointed himself head of the CSIC shura in June, Sheikh Aweys told AFP that: "Ethiopia mistreats the Somalis
under their administration. The land was given to them under colonialists and we will seek justice to resolve the crisis that is dividing the two countries." The implications were clear, and were put even more plainly by Sheikh
Hassan Abdulle Hersi 'Turki' to the German Press Agency on October 24: "Our main agenda is to seize Baidoa, then we will capture Puntland and Somaliland regions...we want to achieve a unified Somalia", which he defined as including the Somali-speaking regions of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Sheikh Hassan Turki, like Sheikh Aweys, was a former leading member of Al-Itihaad al-Islami, classified as a terrorist organisation by the
US, and which was certainly involved in terrorist actions in Ethiopia in the mid 1990s including a number of assassinations and attempted assassinations.

In other words, the CSIC has made clear its intentions to convulse thewhole region of the Horn of Africa with the resurrection of the Somali irredentism, which led to two wars between Somalia and Ethiopia in
the 1960s and 1970s and substantial guerrilla operations in Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia in the 1960s and 1970s. The remains of one such movement lingers onin Ethiopia, the Ogaden National Liberation Front; and while the ONLF decries any intent to join Somalia, it is not above taking support from the CSIC, and indeed from Eritrea, for its armed struggle. To these irredentist aims, the CSIC has added Salafi doctrines and Islamic Jihadism.

As Professor Ken Menkhaus, an advisor to the US State Department, and one of the few ferenj who know something of Somalia, has pointed out, while Ethiopia's policies can certainly be criticized on a number of
levels, nevertheless it "has every right to view current actions [by the CSIC] as tantamount to a declaration of war". Prime Minister Meles has made the same point, though contrary to claims by Somali commentators, repeated by international agencies, he, very carefully, did not declare war. He specified that Ethiopia was ready to respond to the CSIC if attacked, and subsequently told the international press added " we are not
declaring war on Somalia now, neither will we in the future". He said Ethiopia had no problems with Somaliland, Puntland, the Somali people, or even with the CSIC "..[Ethiopia's] problems are with the Jihadist leadership that have declared war against Ethiopia."

Dr. Tekeda Alemu, Minister of State in Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry, in a recent article in Fortune (Ethiopia and the Somali 'Trojan Horse' 26.11.2006) pointed out that "..though they have not been made public, we
have had a number of meetings quietly with representatives of the ICU...". A Foreign Ministry statement (2.12.2006) on a meeting with CSIC officials in Djibouti referred to discussions going back several months, stressing that Ethiopia wanted a constructive and diplomatic solutions not confrontation. Ethiopia has made it quite clear that it supports the Khartoum talks and a dialogue between the TFG and the CSIC, and would welcome an agreement between the two sides. It has not a point that has been given much notice by Mogadishu-fixated journalists and commentators based in Nairobi.

In fact, the presence of a peace-support force in Baidoa will, at worst, do no more than provide an excuse for the attack that the CSIC has already decided on; at best, however, it could encourage the CSIC to open a genuine dialogue with the TFG. The third round of talks in Khartoum between the TFG and the CSIC is scheduled to open in mid-December. Held under the auspices of the Arab League, they will probably be chaired by Kenya as the chairman of IGAD. Both sides should certainly be strongly encouraged to return to the talks, and without preconditions. The main CSIC precondition which led to the failure of the last meeting, the withdrawal of any or all Ethiopian troops from Somalia, was clearly intended to weaken the TFG's bargaining power, as well as provide an immediate opening for its own military advance. Indeed, the CSIC has made every effort to isolate the TFG. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, in the absence of an international force, would do just that. In the first round of talks in June, the CSIC accepted the status of the TFG as the legitimate and recognized government of Somalia. It should be held to this and to the ceasefire it agreed but has subsequently broken almost continuously. Similarly the TFG should be held to its earlier acceptance of the place of the CSIC and acceptance of the major role it played in stabilizing conditions in Mogadishu and in bringing peace to the
city and surrounding areas.

Any number of commentators have suggested the necessity for investing in the peace process; nobody would seriously disagree. According to John Prendergast, a former US National Security Adviser on Africa and now
With the International Crisis Group, this means getting involved in promoting a power-sharing deal between the TFG and the CSIC; the latest ICG Conflict Alert (27.11.2006) makes the same point. Well, yes, power-sharing is an obvious way forward, but this is hardly a plausible option if you deliberately remove most of the negotiating strength from one side (which is of course what the CSIC has been trying to persuade the international community to do). ICG's Nick Grono points out: "You don't win in Somalia by picking one side and support it and funneling arms to it". Certainly not, but this is not what happened in Somalia. As the UN Monitoring Report made very clear, despite the publicity given to Ethiopian support for the TFG, the CSIC has been getting significantly more and better weaponry than the TFG. The ICG is failing to look at the situation on the ground from a joint perspective.

In fact, all too often a good deal of comment seems to bear little relationship to reality. Ted Dagne, a Horn of Africa specialist at the Congressional Research Service, was quoted on November 28 by IPS as arguing
that "if you try to deploy a lightly armed African force into Mogadishu, you're going to have a battle". Quite true, but as no one has actually made any suggestion of deploying a peace-keeping force into Mogadishu, it
is hardly to the point. Similarly, Dagne stresses the need for the CSIC to be involved in any talks implying that this is an issue. It is not. No one has suggested ignoring the CSIC, though persuading it to attend in
Khartoum may be difficult. Dagne is right that the CSIC does have significant popular support in the areas it controls, but he is misleading, as many others, in suggesting that "the TFG really doesn't have control of anything beyond Baidoa". Such a comment shows a quite remarkable ignorance of the current situation in Somalia and of Somali politics in the wide areas not (yet) controlled by the CSIC.

Recent reports from Reuters say that the "EU executive's department for African Development", and "European Commission experts" have been warning that deployment of an IGASOM force could give cover for a larger
Military operation against the CSIC, provide a blank check for neighbouring countries to intervene in Somalia, legitimize an Ethiopian military presence, and undermine EU efforts to reach a political settlement through
dialogue. Anything is possible, but there is no evidence for any of this. Ethiopia has made it clear a long time ago it accepts that any IGASOM or similar force should not include representation the frontline states (Djibouti,
Ethiopia or Kenya.), and will be happy for IGASOM to replace Ethiopian forces in Baidoa. Nor does such a view appear to note the fact that when Ethiopia troops went to Baidoa in July and August, in response to CSIC threats to Baidoa by the advance on Bur Hakaba, they were immediately pulled out again once the CSIC fighters had withdrawn. In other words, Ethiopia has shown very significant restraint in its operations inside Somalia, despite significant provocation. A more plausible reason for EU concern over any proposed peace-support force is that the EU might be asked to help fund it.

It may seem pedantic to complain about such inaccurate journalistic stock phrases as the always "powerful" Islamic Courts', or the perennially "weak" TFG which is "confined to a single town", as in: "Fears for an
all-out war in Somalia have surged as powerful Islamists reinforced positions [at Bur Hakaba] near the seat of the weak government..." (AFP 25.11.2006). But it is important. In fact, support for the TFG has never been confined to the "isolated" town of Baidoa, as both AP and AFP (and Ted Dagne) continually claim. The TFG has support of the towns in the regions of Gedo, most of Bay, Bakool, and part of Middle Juba, as well as Puntland, that is half of Mudug, Nugal, and Bari regions. In other words virtually all the regions in
which the population is not from the Hawiye clan. The CSIS controls the provinces of Lower Shebelle, Benadir, Middle Shebelle, Hiran and Gelgedud, and parts of Mudug and Lower and Middle Juba. This is not "all of southern and central Somalia except the town of Baidoa", it is the areas of central and southern Somalia inhabited by the Hawiye. Another such phrase is "mainly Christian Ethiopia", and this is again is seriously misleading. Ethiopia is not now a mainly Christian state (as AFP keeps claiming), with probably half of
its population Moslem. The fact is, whether intended or not, that the continual repetition of such inaccurate statements has dangerous political effects - not least on international observers who will happily formulate
policy on the basis of such nonsense.

Incidentally, I'd note that AFP doesn't appear to know exactly where Bur Hakaba is despite large reinforcements of CSIC fighters concentrating there. It is currently placing it 30 kms south east of Baidoa, but it has varied from the south east, to south, and to the southwest, as well as moved regularly between 30 and 60 kms from Baidoa. It is in fact 60 km south east of Baidoa, on the road to Mogadishu.

It is perhaps invidious to single out any one commentator, and if productivity was an answer, Dr. Michael Weinstein of Power and Interest News Report (PINR), a US think-tank, would be worth reading. Unfortunately this is not the case; and he isn't. Dr. Weinstein has produced a dozen or so pieces on Somalia this year for PINR, which numbers Herman Cohen, one time US assistant secretary of state for Africa among its analysts. Dr.
Weinstein is a Professor of Political Science at Purdue University; he's interested in political science, psychoanalytic theory, existential phenomenology, the sociology of knowledge, structuralism and post structuralism, and he specializes in what I would regard as somewhat arcane post modernist theory.
His published works include studies in deconstruction, metatheory and culture critique, not, perhaps, the most obvious background for the study of Somali politics.

Dr. Weinstein's comments appear to reflect no more than a minimal knowledge of politics in the Horn of Africa generally or of Somalia in particular, failing to identify the basic parameters of Somali politics or of Ethiopia's
interest in Somalia. He appears to have little understanding of the centrality of the clan in Somali political activity, taking no notice of the various elements of Hawiye clan politics, or the traditional Hawiye rivalry
with the Darod that underlies so much political activity in Somalia since the late 1980s. Nor does he take more than a superficial look at the various elements that make up the CSIC leadership, whether those whose origins
lie in al-Itihaad, or whose religious links are with jihadist Salafi doctrines. Dr. Weinstein does not appear to notice that the CSIC has yet to consolidate its control over all the Hawiye sub-clans, nor indeed is he
apparently aware of where these can be found. The suggestion that the CSIC's move into central Mudug and into Galgudud indicated that the CSIC was "becoming a national movement transcending regions" is simply erroneous. Both of these areas are solidly Habir Gidir/Hawiye, though the Saad/Habir Gidir areas of Mudug most certainly do not entirely support the SCIC. The CSIC has yet to break significantly out of its Hawiye clan configuration.

Dr. Weinstein hardly seems to register that the TFG is the legally constituted and recognized government of Somalia, holding its seat in the UN, in the AU and in IGAD. He consistently assumes it is isolated in Baidoa and totally reliant on external support despite considerable evidence to the contrary. Incidentally, while Somaliland might be described as a break-away mini-state, Puntland, which has never made any effort to break-away from the Somali state, certainly can't. Dr. Weinstein also appears to give credence to virtually every rumor that emanates from Mogadishu via Nairobi, including suggestions that Ethiopia's "secret services" were working with the CIA in support of the ARPCT, and that Ethiopia might have been responsible for the attempted assassination of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf in September, neither of which are plausible except to dedicated conspiracy theorists, in which Somali politics certainly abounds. Dr. Weinstein seems unaware of
the constraints that media sources in Mogadishu now operate under, or indeed of how controversial the BBC Somali Service has become with its consistent support for the CSIC.

There is, of course, no doubt about the strength of the peace dividend in Mogadishu and the strong support the CSIC has received because of its removal of the warlords, as the BBC has frequently reported. Equally, there have been a number of CSIC actions that have caused concern and have been less prominently covered by the Mogadishu based media. It is difficult to see the evidence of moderation in the CSIC's programs and decrees that Dr. Weinstein has discerned. There is some evidence of difference between the various courts - some allow western music, others do not, but overall the CSIC decrees offer very little relaxation in a strict interpretation of Shari'a Law; and the CSIC's growing efforts at centralization of control is going along with a rigorous implementation of Shari'a.

The rules of conduct for the media given to journalists on October 8 are draconian and were described by Reporters sans Frontieres as establishing "a gagged, obedient press, one constrained by threats to sing the praises of the Islamic courts and their vision of the world and Somalia." A number of radio stations have been closed down for carrying information critical of the CSIC or statements allegedly contrary to Islam. The brutal exploitation of minority-clan farmers in the Lower Juba and Shebelle regions, working on plantations owned by prominent members of the CSIC, has continued. The ban on the export of charcoal, widely welcomed by environmentalists at the time, already appears to have been relaxed in the interests of particular businessmen close to the CSIC. There are credible reports that some CSIC members have taken control of much of the trade in foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals with Dubai though private pricing deals and cartels. Despite the praise for the CSIC's removal of former warlord check-points, some around Jowhar, and other towns, have been kept in place to raise income for the courts.

A number of the decrees issued by the CSIC such as trying to control the number of weapons, and banning khat, are likely to remain controversial for some time to come. A majority of the CSIC's own forces are former mooryan militias who were significant consumers of khat when they were fighting for the warlords a few months ago. The decision to ban khat was taken by a few leading members of the CSIC without consultation, and there has been considerable internal criticism of the move. There is suspicion that Some people will stand to gain, and already allegations have surfaced that the ban is being circumvented by a number of well-placed individuals.

Again, while collecting arms is something that many people might agree with as a necessity in a country that is awash with weaponry, there is a corollary: only CSIC affiliated people can now keep their weapons in areas controlled by the courts. Not all businessmen have been happy to hand over their weapons; and some have been concealed.

The CSIC has closed cinemas, banned sea-bathing by women, restricted codes of dress and behavior, banned business during prayer times, banned smoking in public, stopped cohabitation during marriage and banned the playing of loud music and western songs. Political meetings and gatherings were banned in Lower Shebelli on November 18. They are now only allowed with permission from Sheikh Aweys or Sheikh Sharif, the chairman of the executive committee of the CSIC. The cursing of cartoonist Amin Amir by Sheikh Sharif suggests a
lack of humor, if nothing else. The number of demonstrations in Mogadishu as well as other towns gives some indication of opposition to various CSIC decrees, notably the banning of khat.

There has certainly been an influx of jihadist elements and others into Mogadishu to take advantage of the current political/religious climate, but whether this should be seen as a successful Somali Islamic revolution is a
more open question. The fact is that people are seriously scared of the black-flagged jeeps of the Al-Shebaab. Few will talk openly in Mogadishu and there is extensive fear of informers, and an exaggerated but
widespread belief that the Al-Shebaab are "everywhere". This fear grows out of the often ruthless way the Al-Shebaab have imposed themselves on the city since the CSIC takeover, and by its history of assassination and murder. Its commander, Sheikh Ayro, and his followers were credited with more than two hundred killings even before the Courts took control in June.

It is significant that so much of the CSIC regulations are negative, rather than positive, and involve bans on so many activities. There is a climate of suspicion, punishment and control that has been creeping across Mogadishu and the areas held by the courts. It is very much at odds with traditional Somali culture and the Sunni doctrines favored by a majority of Somalis. It will, for example, sit uneasily with tens of thousands of Somali women who certainly welcome peace and security but wonder how they will make a living if they cannot sell khat. The CSIC appear to remain unsympathetic to such concerns.

There is, of course, no doubt that the TFG is also a very fragile construct. In two years it has made very little progress in establishing its authority, though it has done rather more than it is usually given credit for. It has
managed to organize the creation of a structure of local government in Bakool region, and is in the process of implementing a similar administration in Bay. Some progress has been made in the creation of Transitional Federal Institutions, and the Federal parliament has continued to function - despite serious internal divisions, including, notably, the actions of the Speaker of the Parliament and his own, apparently personal, efforts to persuade the CSIC to continue dialogue with himself, if not necessarily with the rest of the TFG. Cynics claim that he will at least succeed to keep safe his own business interests.

One central point about the TFG, which again is usually ignored, is that it is far more of a representative body that the CSIC. The composition of the TFG and of the TFG's parliament is based on the 4.5 formula for clan
representation devised at the Arta conference in Djibouti in 2000. This set up a Transitional National Government which proved abortive, but the formula, although much criticized, was generally accepted and was
used as a basis for the Mbagathi conference in Kenya which set up the TFG in November 2004. Whatever its failings, the 4.5 formula does provide a possible solution to the issue of greater equality within the clan-based
politics of Somalia. It is made up of the 4 main clan families, Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahenweyne with the minority clans having the 0.5 element. The parliamentarians were chosen by representatives from nearly all
Somali clans on that basis.

Somalis opposed to the TFG commonly claim that it is the creature of Ethiopia and that it therefore deserved no aid or assistance This is also a central aspect of the international failure to support, or even allow some credibility to the TFG. This view goes back to the Eldoret/Mbagathi conference where the British in particular gave widespread publicity to their belief that Ethiopia was interfering in the process. By the same token, the British, US and EU argued that their own involvement was entirely altruistic, though this was difficult to accept by anyone who saw the daily morning meetings of David Bell (UK), Glenn Warren (US) and Walid Musa
(EU) at Eldoret. It was difficult for those who saw them crouched over a small table every morning in the hotel courtyard to believe they were only discussing the fine details of conference organization and administration.
Subsequently in Mbagathi, they kept up their efforts, though somewhat less obviously.

It was claimed that Ethiopia "micro-managed" the Mbagathi conference as part of the unraveling of the Arta process. The argument was that "Ethiopia has been and is for a loose Puntland, weak southern Somali states, a
Subdued central region, and Somaliland as a separate state." In fact, this was the "building blocks" approach that the international community as a whole saw as the best way to solve Somalia's problems in the late 1990s. It was firmly demolished by the (unfortunately premature) recognition of the results of the Arta conference by the then UN Special Representative for Somalia, David Stevens.

The aim, and the achievement, of the Mbagathi process was quite the opposite, with the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as president, by a parliament of elders drawn from all over Somalia, and representing all main clan
elements. His opponents quickly spread allegations that Ethiopia had been lavish with bribes to ensure its choice; there were also claims that bribery wasn't confined to Ethiopia. In fact, Abdullahi didn't need bribery
to get elected. His choice was inevitable once the Hawiye failed to unite behind any single Hawiye candidate, allowing a Darod candidate in. In other words Somali clan politics and clan alliances naturally asserted themselves in the wrangles over the vote for president.

It is equally clear to anyone who actually looks at the relationship that Abdullahi has never been in Ethiopia's pocket. He might have been Ethiopia's first choice as president, but that was by comparison with other
candidates, and was largely connected with Abdullahi's views about Islamism and the potential dangers posed by the Islamic Courts. In other areas, such as over the relationship between Somaliland and Puntland, Abdullahi has done considerable damage to Ethiopia's hopes for Somaliland, and has frequently found himself at odds with the Ethiopian government.

The Hawiye probably make up the largest element in southern Somalia's population, including Puntland, but excluding Somaliland, possibly as high as 35%. The Rahenweyne make up another30% and the Darod 20%, and the Dir, with Bantu and other minority clans, the remaining 15% or so. Any figures must be approximate. A few years ago Hawiye politicians suggested that only Somalis born in Somalia should be accepted as Somali citizens. The suggestion was aimed at the Darod who make up most of the Somali populations of Kenya and Ethiopia (those in Djibouti are almost exclusively Dir). If the total Somali speaking population is taken into account, the Hawiye percentage would probably fall to around 25% or less. Clan segmentation incidentally defines Somalis territorially as well as politically and socially. Clans are specifically based on clan territories. It is only in major population centers like Mogadishu or Kismayo, or in towns on the border between clan territories, like Galcayo between Majerteen/Darod and Habir Gidir/Hawiye, that there are multi-clan populations, and Galcayo is essentially divided, north/south between the two.

In the absence of any international support for the TFG, a successful CSIC attack on Baidoa could well force President Abdullahi Yusuf (Majerteen/Darod) to retreat to Puntland, his former base, where he could
expect support from his own Majerteen clan, The Harti/Darod, of which the Majerteen are the major component, control Puntland. A full-scale clan war is then highly probable. In 1991 the Hawiye's United Somali Congress took over the whole of Mogadishu driving out President Siad Barre, and with him virtually all of the Marehan as well as other Darod clans. Siad Barre was from the Marehan/Darod. Thousands died as their properties were seized and Mogadishu was 'cleansed' of Darod, and indeed of other non-Hawiye elements.
The main Hawiye clans, the Abgal and Habir Gidir, then turned on each other with unrestrained ferocity. Tens of thousands died in the fighting in 1991-1992 without achieving a result, leaving a divided city split between General Mohamed Farah 'Aydeed' (Saad/Habir Gidir/Hawiye) and Ali Mahdi (Abgal/Hawiye). Even more died in the famine in 1992 before the first elements of a UNOSOM force arrived in December 1992, and an uneasy peace emerged, broken only by the unsuccessful efforts of the US and UNOSOM to remove General Aydeed.

UNOSOM stayed in Mogadishu until 1995 without making any progress either in organizing a national Somali government, despite several conferences, in bringing together, inter alia the various Hawiye warlords, who between them were to virtually destroy the city. Indeed, as soon as UNOSOM left, they restarted efforts to take control of Mogadishu. Their failure to establish any consensus in Mogadishu or more widely through, for example, the Arta Conference and the Transitional National Government (TNG) led directly to businessmen, and others in search of stability in the city, turning to the Islamic Courts as an alternative source of authority, at least at the local level. While the courts provided this, the process also gave radical Islamic elements the opportunity to take control, which they rapidly did, operating first through two or three courts, among the Ayr and Duduble/Habir Gidir, and then more widely. Former al-Itihaad elements, which had moved into social services after their previous defeat in the mid-1990s in Gedo region, resurfaced. By early 2006 when the CIA attempted to fund an anti-courts warlord alliance, the radical elements were ready for confrontation. And
once he had achieved success in Mogadishu, Sheikh Aweys was ready to try and avenge his previous defeats, one at the hands of Ethiopia in Gedo region in 1995-1996; the other in Puntland at the hands of Abdullahi Yusuf in 1992- as a leader of al-Itihaad, Sheikh Aweys had tried to seize power in Puntland but was heavily defeated by Abdullahi and Majerteen clan militias, and al-Itihaad lost hundreds of fighters. He has not forgotten either reverse.

For the CSIC, or its apologists, to suggest that it is above clan is simply mendacious. Islam has failed over a thousand years to have any impact on Somali clan differences. It isn't doing so now. As I've indicated in a previous article, the CSIC originated among the Hawiye sub-clan Islamic Courts set up after 2000. The first 11 courts in Mogadishu were all clan-based. This element has persisted despite all efforts to centralize control of the 27 Mogadishu courts and the 11 outside Mogadishu. Virtually all those in the CSIC are still based on Hawiye clans. The CSIC shura may be an attempt to expand clan representation, but it is run by a small group of people close to Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and remains essentially an Ayr/Habir Gidir/Hawiye controlled body. Similarly, although the CSIC strike force, the Al-Shebaab, has recruited more widely, its commander is
Sheikh Aden Hashi Aryo (Ayr/Habir Gidir), it is still Hawiye controlled, and the core of its fighters are from the three Ayr courts in Mogadishu. In Somali political terms, it is very clear that the CSIC represents a resurrection of Hawiye attempts to seize power in Somalia.

Similarly, the easy success of the CSIC in taking over Kismayo in August cannot be understood without some knowledge of the clan make-up of the Juba Valley Authority (JVA) which previously controlled the city. The JVA was a fragile coalition of Marehan, Habir Gidir/Ayr and Harti elements within the city, which managed with some difficulty to keep out the main clan in the surrounding areas, the Mohammed Zubeir, an ogaden/Darod clan. The Harti (a construct of Majerteen, Dhulbuhunta and Warsengeli, all Darod clans)Were largely brought into the town in colonial times and now consider themselves as the indigenous population, or guri. Under Siad Barre, his Marehan clan from Gedo region were given control of the town and its substantial
livestock trade. In the early 1990s, after General Aydeed expelled Siad Barre he brought elements of the Habir Gidir/Hawiye clan into the town, taking over many of the plantations along the lower Shebelli valley. The major group involved in this were Ayr/Habir Gider and, with the Marehan, they make up the majority of the outsiders, the galti.

A related factor has been the continual efforts of the Harti to take back their one-time control of the town. Under General Morgan the Harti controlled Kismayo for much of the 1990s; they would like to again.
Indeed, all three groups have spent most of the last few years trying to manipulate the situation to their own advantage. The conflict between galti and guri remains a central factor in Kismayo politics. The appearance of the CSIC provided the opportunity for the Ayr to seize control, forcing out the JVA and Colonel Barre Hiraale (Marehan - not Ayr as Dr, Weinstein claims). Since then Colonel Barre has also failed to hold on to Buaale and Sakow.
The place at which he would be best placed to rally strong Marehan support would, however, be Bardhere in the southern part of Gedo region. This was formerly a Rahenweyne town, seized by the Marehan some years ago; they will be very loath to lose it to the CSIC.

Any analysis of the growth of the CSIC demonstrates that Sheikh Aweys' bid for power is based on fundamentalist Salafi jihadist doctrines, coupled with the concept of Greater Somalia. The first, highly implausible in any longer-term Somali context, has been balanced by a more popular appeal to Somali nationalism which has the added attraction of offering a potential means for the CSIC to move outside the Hawiye envelope, and more specifically out of the Ayr/Habir Gidir/Hawiye. The essential factor
here is less religion than power and control. It is another attempt to produce a shared national political agenda for Somalia. In the 1970s Siad Barre tried this by introducing Socialism to add to the original pan-Somali
concept. Neither provided a satisfactory solution to the fundamental divisiveness of Somali clan politics. In the longer term, it is highly unlikely that the CSIC's Islamic fundamentalism or the reactivation of the concept of
Greater Somalia, will be any more successful in providing Sheikh Aweys and the Hawiye with a means to power.

In fact, despite all the CSIC efforts to portray the conflict with the TFG as an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the fact remains that the present conflict between the TFG and the CSIC is actually a continuation of the Somali civil wars of the last fifteen years. The CSIC has done its best to conceal this with its allegations against Ethiopia, and by its own acquisitions of support from outside, particularly Eritrea. This has allowed Eritrea, and other opponents of the Ethiopian regime including the OLF and ONLF, space to operate against Ethiopia, but it has not replaced the fundamentally clan-based nature of the conflict in Somalia – Hawiye against Darod.

Certainly the CSIC are a largely grassroots Somali organization and not an import; any al Qaeda influence remains small. Equally, the view of the Los Angeles Times that the CSIC is not "..imposing religious orthodoxy, [but] instead has softened its views...and is pushing for democratic elections" is far from accurate. Despite the strictures of the CSIC, the TFG provides for Islamic Law under the National Charter agreed at Mbagathi, and the governments in Somaliland and Puntland are both Islamic administrations; all Somalis are Muslim after all. The difference with the CSIC is one of degree, with the CSIC demanding all judicial decisions should be Shari'a. While more moderate elements in the CSIC appear to accept that there could possibly be
discussion on this, Sheikh Aweys and the supporters of Salafism do not. In Puntland, President Mohamud 'Adde' has produced a possible way forward though there has been no indication that the CSIC is prepared to
compromise. Responding to requests from a number of Puntland religious leaders to discuss an increase in the level of Shari'a within Puntland's judicial structure, currently well over 50%, he agreed to set up a committee
of Sheikhs, traditional leaders, and government officials to advise the government. A spokesman for Puntland's religious leaders described this as satisfactory. In fact, while some want an increased level of Shari'a law in Puntland, there is little popular demand for its complete application; nor do Puntland religious leaders (Darod) want anything to do with the Jihadist leaders of the CSIC (Hawiye). Indications are that the CSIC do not find
this acceptable.

The CSIC itself is hardly monolithic over the application of Shari'a law. Made up of some 40 separate courts, the efforts of the CSIC shura and the leadership to impose uniformity have, so far, been no more than partially successful. Sufi traditionalists and moderate Islamic groups like al-Islah still have considerably more popular support than the jihadists elements of al-Itihaad and al-Shebaab, as demonstrated by the CSIC need to ban
al-Islah meetings.

The CSIC leadership quite deliberately associated itself with the international confrontation between Islam and non-believers, just as the TFG has associated itself with the US war on terror. The situation has been complicated regionally by Eritrea's involvement, encouraging the CSIC into confrontation with Ethiopia, and supporting the armed struggles of the OLF and ONLF in Ethiopia as part of its long-term campaign of destabilization of Ethiopia, to recover Badme and take revenge for defeat in 2000. President Issayas appears to have little concern about plunging Somalia into conflict if it will embarrass Ethiopia in some way, and the new Eritrean warning (2.12.2006) of "chaos and turmoil" if an African force is deployed in Baidoa suggests it will continue its support for the CSIC.

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The Ethiopian presence in Baidoa has provided a guarantee for the survival of the TFG and for the limitation of conflict in Somalia. Without this support for the TFG and Puntland, it is clear that the CSIC would have rapidly attempted to continue an immediate expansion across the rest of Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland, threatening to spark off a major clan conflict between the Hawiye and the Darod, and a return to the worst days of the civil war in the early 1990s when the Hawiye and Darod slaughtered each other and themselves with abandon.

An international force to ensure the survival of the TFG would provide a solution for the controversial presence of Ethiopian forces, though it would not remove the issues in dispute between the CSIC and Ethiopia. Any international force should be coupled with strict enforcement of the arms embargo, to prevent any more arms going into Somalia by sea, air or land, and stop the further build-up of sophisticated weapons for the CSIC.
All troops/fighters from any other countries should be moved out. The aim would be to support a ceasefire, not undermine it.

The reason why the CSIC is so bitterly opposed to a peace-keeping force in Baidoa is quite simple and has really very little to do with Islam, the jihad, or any war on terror. It is simply that such a force will prevent the
Hawiye CSIC taking over Baidoa and forcing out a Darod government. The CSIC's continued insistence on the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian forces suggests the CSIC is determined to remove the TFG completely rather
Than co-operate. In fact, any compromise would probably necessitate the CSIC sidelining its more extreme Salafi wing and adopting a more moderate political stance. Whether the CSIC could do this, remains an open
question, but it should be given all possible assistance.

The Salafi leadership in Mogadishu is using Somali irredentism (not nationalism) as a political factor in its bid for power. It is rejecting a carefully framed and balanced government that may have considerable faults but it is a government that is based on a formula that prevents domination by any single clan. This, rather than Ethiopian interference, is what the conflict in Somalia is all about. Somalis often make assumptions about Ethiopia's policies towards Somalia based on dubious evidence and traditional prejudices. This is understandable in such a volatile relationship.

It is, however, inexcusable for the international community to make so little effort to understand the issues involved. Journalists, commentators and analysts often display a singular lack of objectivity on the Horn of Africa, largely induced by an equally obvious lack of knowledge. Many appear to have little or no experience of the region about which they pontificate, and apparently never even visit. They, too, appear to make assumptions based on traditional prejudice.

A clear distinction should have been drawn between Ethiopia's response to an appeal for assistance from a legitimate and internationally recognized government, and Eritrea's supply of arms to a belligerent Salafi
Jihadist movement that makes no secret of the fact that it wants to overthrow that government as well as launch an irredentist movement to destabilize all its three neighbors. Eritrea has also used this jihadist movement to support armed opposition movements with intent to destabilize one of its own neighbours, and as the UN Monitoring Report makes clear, it has even moved over 2,000 troops into Somalia.

With the exception of Sheikh Aweys and the Salafi faction in the CSIC, no one doubts, certainly not the Ethiopian government, that both Ethiopia and Somalia would benefit from good relations, but this needs the removal of suspicion on both sides. Ethiopia must prove its genuine support for the reconstruction of a Somali state, though whether such a state should include Somaliland should, of course, remain a matter for Somalis, and, of course, for the people of Somaliland. It would also, of course, expect to see an end to the CSIC efforts to re-energize Somali irredentism.

Ethiopian policies towards Somalia may not always have been the best possible, and, like the rest of the International community, Ethiopia has been unable to see a workable solution. But that is not for want of
trying. There have been the conferences of Addis Ababa and Sodere, and support for the concept of building blocks, the main option supported by the International Community in the later 1990s. Ethiopia's actions over
the last two or three years clearly indicate it has dropped support for "building blocks", and would now like to see southern Somalia, at least, united under a single government with which it could deal, not a dangerously
fractured and divided state.

Somalia is currently facing the effects of severe flooding, with several hundred thousand people displaced and dozens, probably hundreds killed. Earlier this year, 1.5 million people needed food aid following
drought. The drought cycle now appears to be recurring every three years not the eight there used to be between famines. The country has already suffered almost irreversible environmental damage; population pressures continue to add to the problems. The last thing Somalia needs is another war, but that is exactly what a belligerent and aggressive CSIC continues to offer, even demand.

There are obvious moves that both the CSIC and the TFG could take to improve the prospects of agreement in Khartoum if, that is, either side are serious and both turn up in mid-December. The CSIC accepted the legitimacy of the TFG at the first Khartoum meeting. It should now accept the implications of this, just as the TFG should accept the reality of the CSIC power in Hawiye areas. There is room for the UN Special Representative on Somalia to play a much more active role at Khartoum, as part of orchestrated International efforts to enforce disengagement and dialogue on both the CSIC and the TFG.

What Somalia needs is a moderate and a competent government. The TFG may be moderate; it is hardly competent. The CSIC may be relatively competent; it is certainly not moderate. On any rational basis, with the country facing major humanitarian crises, there must be room for political compromise.This is what the policies of the international community should be providing.

Antony Shaw

Addis Ababa 4.12.2006

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[1] The current designation is the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSIC) but the courts have also been designated by the title Islamic Courts Union (ICU) as well as Supreme Council of IslamicCourts (SCIC), and both, particularly ICU, are still sometimes used. I have used CSIC throughout, even though this is strictly speaking an inaccurate designation before October 2006